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Intrusion and the Investigative Reporter*
Men with the muckrake are often indispensable to the well-being
of society, but only if they know when to stop raking the muck.
-Theodore Roosevelt1
The investigative reporter,2 like the spy and the sociologist, must
sometimes go under cover to gather information.' Because going under
cover allows the reporter to witness events from the inside, as a partici-
pant-observer, undercover newsgathering has proven effective4 in exposing
fraud, corruption, and illegal activity in government and industry.5
Indeed, in some instances, the use of subterfuge may be the only means of
uncovering serious abuses and spurring reform. A recent expos6 produced
by the television program 20/20 graphically illustrates this point.' In an
award-winning series of Houston Chronicle articles, reporter Nancy Stancill
* The author thanks Professor David Anderson and Howard Lidsky.
1. STEPHEN KLAIDMAN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, THE VIRTUOUS JOURNALIST 10 (1987) (quoting
TheodoreRoosevelt, Address on the Laying of the Cornerstone of the House Office Building (Apr. 14,
1906)).
2. One basic-reporting textbook describes investigative reporting as follows: "Any good reporting
is investigative reporting. But the term has come to mean reporting in depth to reveal public or private
behavior that otherwise might go unseen-usually criminal or antisocial behavior, but not always."
MITCHELL V. CHARNLEY & BLAIR CHARNLEY, REPORTING 337 (4th ed. 1979). James King and
Frederick Muto note that investigativejournalism is intrinsic to the "new journalism," i.e., journalism
"through which reporters attempt to use the communications media to influence society directly."
James E. King & Frederick T. Muto, Compensatory Damages for Newsgatherer Torts: Toward a
Workable Standard, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919, 919 n.1 (1981).
3. PHILIP MEYER, ETHICAL JOURNALiSM 78 (1987).
4. The effectiveness of undercover investigative reporting stems from the fact that "[a] reporter
whose identity is not known ... is uninhibited, has no worry about offending news sources, and has
the clandestine privilege of observing news figures when they are off guard." CHARNLEY &
CHARNLEY, supra note 2, at 344-45.
5. Charniley and Charnley provide examples of the uses of undercover or "infiltration" reporting
and note that the results of undercover newsgathering "are almost always admired and frequently of
high public service." Id. at 337. Undercover newsgathering is just one of the tools of the investigative
reporter. Regardless of the method used, investigative reporting is a powerful tool for social reform.
See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) ("The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening
public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and
generally informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences .... ."); LEONARD DOWNIE, JR.,
THE NEW MUCKRAKERS 255-56 (1976) (arguing that the new muckrakers have brought major
governmental reforms); Haynes Johnson, A Ruling the Muckrakers Would Decry, WASH. POST, Apr.
14, 1985, at A3 (defending "muckrakers" as having "relentlessly exposed pervasive corruption").
6. 20/20: Victims of Greed, (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 25, 1991).
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uncovered shocking conditions in Texas nursing homes.7 However,
reforms were not implemented until 20/20, following Stancill's lead,
conducted a three-month, undercover investigation of the treatment of
elderly residents at Texas state and private nursing home facilities! The
resulting photos, taken with a hidden camera, were horrifying: residents
were tied to their beds, starved, abused, and left to lie in filth.9 Some
even died because of the subhuman treatment they received."0 As a result
of the 20/20 investigation and the public outrage it provoked, prompt
reform measures ensued. A member of the Texas Board of Health who
chaired the subcommittee on nursing home policy resigned, and Governor
Ann Richards called for a state investigation of all nursing home facili-
ties." By employing subterfuge to gather news, the 20/20 reporters
enhanced the immediacy and credibility of the resulting story. As one
journalist argued, "[Jiust describing the conditions wouldn't have cut it.
They had to be seen." 2 Without the use of subterfuge, it is doubtful
whether 20/20 could have obtained the graphic footage that gave the story
its gut-wrenching impact. Subterfuge represents a potent weapon in the
fight for social reform.
A recent 60 Minutes expos6 provides a convincing, if less dramatic,
case for the efficacy and importance of subterfuge as a newsgathering
method. 3 Posing as a potential investor, reporter Steve Kroft uncovered
an illicit odometer rollback scheme at a Houston car dealership."4 The
hidden camera crew captured the perpetrator of the rollback scheme, the
singularly unrepentant Bill Whitlow, boasting of his illegal activity.' 5 As
a result of the 60 Minutes sting, federal investigators prosecuted Whitlow
and four other participants for their crimes.'6 District Judge John Rainey,
who sentenced Whitlow, conceded that the "crisis of confidence created by
that broadcast demanded a stiff prison term." 7 Hence, both of the
preceding examples underscore the important role of undercover news-
gathering in safeguarding the public welfare. 8
7. Nancy Stancill, Deadly Neglect: Texas and Its Nursing Homes (pts. 1-5), Hous. CHPON., July
22-26, 1990, at Al, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
8. Ann Hodges, Texas Nursing Home Woes Focus of 20120, HOUs. CHRON., Oct. 24, 1991, at
3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
9. 20/20, supra note 6.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Hodges, supra note 8, at 3. 20/20 reporter Hugh Downs likewise stated: "[Olur only way to
show what's really happening was to go in with hidden cameras." 20/20, supra note 6.
13. 60 Minutes: Cream Puff (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 8, 1991).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Jim Zook, Man Given 7-Year Term for Odometer Tampering, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 11, 1992,
at A29 (2-star ed.), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
17. Id.
18. An additional example demonstrates the importance of this newsgathering technique in cases
[Vol. 71:433
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Despite the salutary effects of these innovative reporting techniques,
however, the investigative freedom of the reporter "collides head-on" ' 9
with the individual's right of privacy?0 As the outcry sparked by the
revelation of Arthur Ashe's AIDS status revealed,2 private individuals are
becoming increasingly concerned about press abuses. In fact, modern
observers have criticized the press for being "far more interested in finding
sleaze and achieving fame and fortune than in serving as an honest broker
of information between citizens and government."I Such criticism of the
press is not new. In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued in
"perhaps the most famous and certainly the most influential law review
article ever"' that "[the press is overstepping in every direction the
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency."' In an attempt to curb
such perceived abuses, the authors called upon the common law to create
a "right to be let alone."' Hence, their article, The Right to Privacy,'
formed the basis for the common-law tort of invasion of privacy.'
where the victims may be powerless against abuses committed by those in positions of authority. In
a Houston Chronicle investigation, reporters posing as patients unveiled shocking and unethical
practices at a private psychiatric hospital. As a result of the investigation, the Texas Attorney General
filed suit for "medical fraud and abuse, kickbacks, illegally recruiting patients and falsely billing a state
compensation fund for crime victims." Psychiatric Hospitals: Money-Spinners, ECONOMIST, Feb. 22,
1992, at 24-25.
19. Don R. Pember & Dwight L. Teeter, Jr., Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50
WASH. L. REv. 57, 59 (1974); cf RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCi-TY 119
(1992) ("Freedom of expression and the right to privacy are often thought of as natural enemies, but
it is better to think of them as jealous siblings.').
20. Even though privacy is a central concept in our culture, it is exceedingly amorphous. As
Judith Jarvis Thomson has noted, "Perhaps the most striking thing about the right to privacy is that
nobody seems to have any clear idea what it is.' Judith 1. Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in RIGHTS,
RES UTION, & RISK 117, 117 (1986). Even though privacy is difficult to define, however, few doubt
its importance in modem society. According to Rodney Smolla, "Laws protecting privacy are the
means through which the collective acknowledges rules of civility that are designed to affirm human
autonomy and dignity." SMOLLA, supra note 19, at 119.
21. Alex S. Jones, News Media Sharply Divided on When Right to Know Becomes Intrusion, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Bi1.
22. LARRY 1. SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY: How ATrACK JOURNALISM HAS TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (1991).
23. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203 (1954).
24. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 196
(1890). The tort of invasion of privacy originated with this article. The first case recognizing the
existence of the privacy tort is from this century. See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
68, 71 (Ga. 1905). It should be noted, however, that the first case to consider the right of privacy
rejected it. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902).
25. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 193.
26. Id.
27. See Nimmer, supra note 23, at 203 (saying that it is "primarily due to the persuasiveness of
[the Warren and Brandeis] article" that 15 state courts have recognized a common-law right of privacy);
cf. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 384-88 (1960) (crediting a "long line of law
review discussions of the right of privacy" to The Right to Privacy).HeinOnline  -- 71 Tex. L. Rev.  435 1992-1993
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In its modem incarnation, invasion of privacy consists of four
separate torts:" (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, (2)
publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light, (3) publication of private
facts, and (4) commercial exploitation or misappropriation of the plaintiff's
name or likeness.29 It is the first category, intrusion upon seclusion,'
that most affects newsgathering. An intrusion is essentially a "psychic
trespass." 3' As defined by the widely adopted Restatement (Second) of
Torts section 652B, the intrusion tort imposes liability upon a reporter (or
a private individual)32 if she "intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs
or concerns."33 In addition, the defendant's conduct must be "highly
offensive to a reasonable person. " ' The intrusion tort thus makes
actionable conduct that exceeds "tolerable bounds of social deportment." 35
By creating a qualified "right to be let alone,"3 6 the tort seeks to protect
the individual's sphere of privacy,37 whether locational or psychological,
28. Prosser, supra note 27, at 389 (articulating for the first time this division of the privacy tort).
Some commentators question the wisdom of Prosser's fourfold division of the privacy tort. See, e.g.,
Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 962 (1964) (arguing that invasion of privacy is a single tort whose purpose is the protection
of human dignity); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 326 (1966) (criticizing the tort as purposeless except in cases of commercial
appropriation).
29. Prosser, supra note 27, at 389. The privacy tort is unique in the sense that it is largely a
creation of law review articles, originating with the Warren and Brandeis article. However, an equally
influential contribution to its development was Prosser's fourfold categorization, which has become
integral to discussion of privacy issues and is reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A-
652E (1977).
30. Examples of intrusion include "[e]avesdropping, peeping through windows, and surreptitiously
opening another's mail." SMOLLA, supra note 19, at 145.
31. Id. Dean Prosser describes intrusion as having been created primarily to "fill in the gaps left
by trespass, nuisance, the intentional infliction of mental distress, and whatever remedies there may be
for the invasion of constitutional rights." Prosser, supra note 27, at 392.
32. This Note focuses primarily upon the effect of the intrusion tort upon the newsgatherer.
However, the cases dealing with media defendants are actually a minority of the intrusion cases. In
fact, a five-year survey (1986-1990) of all intrusion cases appearing in West's reporters reveals that
media comprise a fairly small portion of defendants (10%). A. Lynn Boswell & Lyrissa C. Barnett,
An Empirical Analysis of Intrusion 22 (June 1, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas
Law Review).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
34. Id.
35. Munley v. ISC Fin. House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Okla. 1978).
36. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888) (articulating for the first time a
right "to be let alone"); see also Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,467 (1952) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) ("The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom."); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, I., dissenting) (describing the right to privacy as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men').
37. See WiLLimAm L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971)
(describing the expansion of this sphere of privacy beyond mere physical seclusion to the right to be
free from practices such as eavesdropping and persistent phone calls).
436
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from the obtrusive and obnoxious delving of others. Publication is not an
element of the tort.38
At what cost has tort doctrine carved out this zone of privacy? As
the intrusion doctrine is currently formulated, its "highly offensive"
standard offers only a "nebulous guidepost" to a newsgatherer "interested
in knowing how far he or she can push into the private realm of
another."" Moreover, the case law evinces a strong suggestion that
investigative reporters who employ unconventional means of newsgathering
may face liability for intrusion.' Neither First Amendment juris-
prudence41 nor tort law achieve a satisfactory mediation of the conflicts
between individual privacy and press freedom: one that protects beneficial
press activities without sacrificing the individual's right of privacy and
separates legitimate newsgathering techniques from unwarranted intrusion.
Due to the uncertain nature of the constitutional and common-law
limitations upon newsgathering, even the most conscientious editors,
reporters, and media lawyers may not be able to determine the boundaries
of protected investigative activity.42 In the case of the 20/20 expos6, for
example, neither First Amendment analysis nor the decisional law clearly
answers the question whether that use of subterfuge was a legitimate
reporting tool. 3
Using the 20/20 case as a paradigm, this Note argues that, in order
to distinguish protected newsgathering activity from intrusion, a brighter
line must be drawn between individual privacy and the press's duty to
gather news. Part I surveys constitutional doctrine and state tort law,
which, on balance, offer little protection to a newsgatherer employing
novel or "nonroutine" newsgathering techniques. Part II details the
dangers of current doctrine to the newsgatherer and to the free flow of
information that affects public welfare. To remedy these dangers, Part III
advocates the adoption of a qualified common-law privilege. This privilege
would permit a newsperson to employ subterfuge (and other innovative
reporting techniques) to monitor the work-related activities of those
engaged in the public business. The privilege would not, however, give
the press free rein to employ subterfuge to pry into individuals' private
lives. The privilege would attach only in cases where the press could
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977).
39. BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY: THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF LITIGATION
§ 11.2.1, at 430 (1987).
40. See infra subpart I(B).
41. See infra subpart I(A).
42. See King & Muto, supra note 2, at 924 ("Unfortunately, the few cases which have discussed
newsgatherer tort liability... provide few guidelines for reporters to assess the legal consequences of
their investigative conduct.").
43. See infra Parts I & H.
1992]
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demonstrate that it had probable cause (as currently applied in malicious
prosecution cases) to believe that the plaintiff was engaged in illegal or
harmful activities. The privilege would provide corresponding protection
to the private individual by completely barring press intrusions into the
home. Finally, the privilege would be delimited by the doctrine of abuse
of privilege, which would prevent the press from employing the privilege
for inappropriate or abusive purposes. Thus, the creation of a qualified
common-law privilege would provide the needed mediation between the
individual's right to be free from intrusion upon seclusion and the
investigative freedom of the reporter.
I. Constitutional and Common-Law Constraints on Newsgathering
Both First Amendment jurisprudence and the intrusion tort may
inhibit novel methods of newsgathering because they do not delineate what
types of newsgathering activities are protected. The earnest newsperson or
media lawyer who seeks to avoid liability for intrusion will find few clear
guidelines. Although the Supreme Court has indicated that "news
gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,"' its First
Amendment jurisprudence establishes that these protections do not include
immunity from tort liability.' Thus, the newsperson must look to state
tort law to assess the legal consequences of his newsgathering conduct.
But the case law dealing with media intrusions is relatively sparse, and the
extant decisions never make explicit whether newsgathering techniques such
as subterfuge constitute intrusive invasions of privacy. Instead, the
"sparse, inchoate rules"' force the newsperson to engage in a dangerous
guessing game when employing innovative or nonroutine reporting
techniques.
A. The Legacy of Branzburg v. Hayes
Despite the indisputable logic of the proposition that news cannot be
disseminated without first being gathered,47 the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence provides the press no immunity from liability for
torts committed in the course of newsgathering.' In the leading case of
44. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
45. Id. at 691-92; cf. MARC A. FRANKUN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW 679 (4th
ed. 1990) (observing that in defamation and privacy cases involving publication rather than
newsgathering, otherwise tortious conduct is sometimes constitutionally protected).
46. King & Muto, supra note 2, at 921.
47. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("A corollary of the right to publish must
be the right to gather news."); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) ("We
agree that newsgathering is an integral part of news dissemination."); see also In re Mack, 126 A.2d
679, 689 (Pa. 1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (commenting that, absent a right to gather news,
"freedom of the press becomes a river without water"), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957).
48. The refusal to grant the press immunity from torts or crimes committed in the course of
438 [Vol. 71:433
HeinOnline  -- 71 Tex. L. Rev.  438 1992-1993
Investigative Reporting
Branzburg v. Hayes,49 the Court acknowledged that "without some pro-
tection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be evis-
cerated."' Yet having recognized the existence of a constitutional right
to gather news, the Court went on to strictly limit its application by
insisting that the press possesses no "constitutional right of special access
to information not available to the public generally. "" Moreover, the
Court rejected as "frivolous" the argument that the First Amendment
should immunize newsgatherers from criminal liability.52
Supreme Court cases since Branzburg have given little content to the
constitutional right to gather news. In the cases addressing press access to
prisons and prisoners, the Supreme Court held that no balancing of First
Amendment interests was necessary where state and federal restrictions on
access applied equally to the press and to the general public. 3 In cases
dealing with courtroom access, the Court established that both the press
and the public have a right of access to criminal trials absent an overriding
state interest.' The Supreme Court has never extended any additional or
special protection to media defendants in tort suits involving news-
gathering.
Similarly, media arguments for special protection for newsgathering
have fallen largely on deaf ears in the lower courts. Lower courts
addressing intrusion claims generally refuse to weigh any First Amendment
interest in gathering news in the balance. In Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,'
the Ninth Circuit held that, when two media defendants'used false identities
to gain access to the plaintiff's home and subsequently recorded their
conversations with him, the reporters were completely unprotected by the
First Amendment. 6 In language that has been widely cited and fol-
lowed,57 the Dietemann court stated:
newsgathering stems from the principle that the press is subject to the "application of general laws."
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937)).
49. 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that a journalist has no First Amendment privilege to withhold
from a grand jury information he has received in confidence).
50. Id. at 681.
51. Id. at 684. Branzburg endorsed the view of Zemel v. Rusk that "[t]he right to speak and
publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
1, 17 (1965) (holding that the U.S. government could impose restrictions on a citizen's right to travel
to Cuba to inform himself of world affairs).
52. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691.
53. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978); Saxbev. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 849 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974).
54. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) ("Mhe State's
justification in denying access [to criminal trials] must be a weighty one."); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that the right to attend criminal
trials is "implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment").
55. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
56. Id. at 249.
57. See, e.g., Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (App. Div. 1978) (observing that
1992]
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The First Amendment has never been construed to accord news-
men immunity from torts or crimes committed during the course
of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license to
trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the
precincts of another's home or office. It does not become such
a license simply because the person subjected to the intrusion is
reasonably suspected of committing a crime.5"
Thus, following the Supreme Court's lead, lower courts have not recog-
nized the need to extend First Amendment protections where state tort law
proscribes certain newsgathering behaviors.59 One court even noted the
"apparent hopelessness" of a defendant's arguments that the First
Amendment shielded the media from liability for trespass.'
The Second Circuit has somewhat more generously acknowledged
that a balancing of First Amendment interests may be warranted where
there is an "overriding public interest" in the information being
gathered.6 In Galella v. Onassis, the court considered the defendant's
argument for First Amendment protection, noting that the plaintiff was "a
public figure and thus subject to news coverage." 6' The defendant Galella
was a paparazzo who used unconventional means to photograph Jacqueline
Onassis and her children.' Nonetheless, the court held that "when
weighed against the de minimis public importance of the daily activities of
the defendant, Galella's constant surveillance, his obtrusive and intruding
presence, was unwarranted and unreasonable."' The court even stated
that the First Amendment does not provide a "wall of immunity protecting
the First Amendment is not "a shibboleth before which all other rights must succumb"); Prahl v.
Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (concluding that members of the press do not
have a constitutional privilege to trespass); Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 225 (Sup. Ct.
1981) (noting that privilege concepts do not apply in determining liability for torts committed prior to
publication).
58. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
59. But cf. Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1527 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment after balancing the press's First Amendment rights against
the individual's constitutional right of privacy), afftd, 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1171 (1992); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540, 1546
(C.D. Cal. 1990) (recognizing that "gathering information for dissemination to the public" is a
protected First Amendment activity), aft'd, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
60. Allen v. Combined Communications, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2417,2418 (Dist. Ct., Denver
County, Colo., 1981) (dismissing on other grounds a trespass action against press representatives who
entered the defendant's premises to cover a news event).
61. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973).
62. Id. at 995.
63. Id. at 991-92. Galella often "jumped and postured around" while taking pictures of Mrs.
Onassis and her children; upon one occasion, Galella even jumped into the path of John Kennedy, Jr.
while he was riding his bicycle, forcing him to "swerve his bike dangerously." Id.
64. Id. at 995.
[Vol. 71:433
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newsmen from any liability for their conduct while gathering news. " '
The press, like the general public, will be liable for torts or crimes
committed while newsgathering.1
The courts have thus made it clear that they will not easily interfere
with state tort law to grant the press constitutional immunity from tort
liability.67 Although the cases contain a strong implication that routine
reporting techniques will receive constitutional protection," this gives
little consolation or guidance to the investigative reporter employing
nonroutine reporting techniques.
B. The Intrusion Tort and Nonroutine Reporting Techniques
Consider, then, the dilemma of an investigative reporter who has
discovered reliable evidence that a congressperson is accepting bribes.
May the reporter impersonate a lobbyist to investigate this claim?
Although the discovery and airing of such information would be socially
beneficial, constitutional law affords the reporter no protection if the
congressperson sues for intrusion.' Consequently, the investigative
reporter attempting to determine whether to go under cover to gather news
must look to tort law for the answers that constitutional law does not
provide.' But tort law provides no clear answer to his dilemma.71 If
he decides to employ subterfuge, he must do so at the peril of possible tort
liability.
Neither general principles of privacy law nor specific cases dealing
with subterfuge reveal whether it is a legitimate (nontortious) newsgather-
ing technique. The Restatement definition of intrusion does little to
circumscribe the bounds of protected activity. According to this definition,
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1971) (stating that
constitutional privileges "developed in defamation cases and to some extent in privacy actions in which
publication is an essential component are not relevant in determining liability for intrusive conduct
antedating publication").
68. See, e.g., Nicholsonv. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 Cal. Rptr. 58 (Ct. App. 1986) ("IThe
news gathering component of the freedom of the press-the right to seek out information-is privileged
at least to the extent it involves 'routine ... reporting techniques.'").
69. However, the reporter will not be liable if he merely accepts tortiously acquired materials.
In Pearson v. Dodd, several members of Senator Dodd's staff took confidential information from the
Senator's files and gave it to newspaper columnists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. The columnists
were held not liable for invasion of Dodd's privacy. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 703, 706 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
70. See Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv.
1205, 1285 (1976) (criticizing the dominant role of tort law by arguing that "[w]here first amendment
values are at stake, the state cannot be allowed the last word in determining what is an appropriate
privilege").
71. See King & Mute, supra note 2, at 924 (stating that the intrusion cases "provide few
guidelines for reporters to assess the legal consequences of their investigative conduct").
1992]
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a newsgatherer will be liable where she "intentionally intrudes, physically
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs
or concerns ... [and] the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person."' The reporter does not have to publish the infor-
mation gathered to incur liability.73 As a doctrinal matter, the intrusion
tort protects the individual's sphere of privacy, whether locational or
psychological;' it redresses injury to the individual's feelings and
sensibilities, his "emotional sanctum."' Moreover, by adopting the
"highly offensive to a reasonable person" standard, the intrusion tort
evinces a broader purview: it safeguards societal norms of conduct,76
making actionable conduct that "has clearly exceeded tolerable bounds of
social deportment."'
Even so, the privacy interest protected by the intrusion tort is not
absolute." Individuals cannot be protected from every invasion; they
must learn to deal with the "inevitable concomitants of life in an industrial
and densely populated society."" Hence, a defendant will ordinarily not
be liable for observing and recording "matters which occur in a public
place or a place otherwise open to the public eye"' unless his actions are
unusually obtrusive l or highly embarrassing to the plaintiff.s' These
principles, however, do not directly address the dilemma of the reporter
who desires to use surreptitious surveillance' to gather information that
72. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToTS § 652B (1977).
73. Id. cmt. b.
74. See PROSSER, supra note 37, § 117 (listing both physical and psychological intrusions that have
been held actionable).
75. Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983).
76. See generally Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957, 963
(1989) (discussing the relationship between privacy law and "civility rules" in our culture).
77. Munley v. ISC Fin. House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Okla. 1978).
78. Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329, 330 (D.S.C. 1966).
79. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 768 (N.Y. 1970).
80. Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (citations omitted). Courts
appear to use the terms "public place" and "place otherwise open to the public eye" synonymously in
the intrusion context. See id. (failing to distinguish the two concepts); see also Gill v. Hearst
Publishing Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1953) (equating appearing in a "public market place" with
exposing oneself "to public gaze in a pose open to the view of any persons who might then be
[nearby]"). I will use the term "public" in a different sense in Part III of this Note.
81. See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994-95 (2d Cir. 1973) (describing the plaintiff's
"inexcusable" conduct, including "intentional touching" of Mrs. Onassis and her children and
endangering the safety of the children while they were swimming, waterskiing, and horseback riding).
82. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964) (upholding a
judgment in favor of a woman who was photographed with her skirt blown over her head while she
was exiting a funhouse).
83. Intrusion claims against media defendants commonly fall into three categories: "surreptitious
surveillance, traditional trespass, and instances where consent to enter into a secluded setting for one
purpose has been exceeded by the invitee." Victor A. Kovner & Harriette K. Dorsen, Recent
Developments in Intrusion, Private Facts, False Light and Commercialization Claims, in 3 PRACTISINs
LAW INSTITUTE, COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1990, at 775, 783. Surreptitious surveillance claims "have
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cannot be obtained in a public place.
In fact, courts have never specifically stated whether subterfuge
constitutes an actionable intrusion. Dietemann v. Time, Inc.," the
seminal case in this area, strongly suggested that the use of subterfuge
might subject reporters to tort liability; however, the court did not provide
newsgatherers with an adequate conceptual framework to determine when
they may "take unconventional investigative steps without invoking the
sanctions of tort law."I In Dietemann, two Life reporters, claiming they
had been sent by a friend of the plaintiff,86 posed as patients to gain
access to the home of Mr. Dietemann, "a disabled veteran with little
education.., engaged in the practice of healing with clay, minerals, and
herbs-as practiced, simple quackery."' Once inside Mr. Dietemann's
home, the Life reporters recorded their conversations using a hidden
camera and transmitter."8 They later used this information for an expos6
entitled "Crackdown on Quackery."89
Although the Dietemann court held that the reporters' actions
constituted intrusion,' it never signified the decisive factor in its decision.
The court noted that the intrusion occurred in the plaintiff's home, albeit
in the office portion of his home; that the reporters gained entrance by
subterfuge; and that they recorded the plaintiff's conversation without his
consent using electronic recording devices.91 But it did not indicate which
factor or combination of factors triggered liability. The court particularly
emphasized and condemned the reporters' use of "hidden mechanical
contrivances. " ' Judge Shirley Hufstedler argued that the "successful
practice [of investigative reporting] long antecedes the invention of
miniature cameras and electronic devices."' This comment is very
telling, for it suggests that perhaps the real basis for the judge's decision
arisen in the context of peering into windows, electronically recording conversations without the
consent of all parties, unauthorized reproduction of private documents, and obtaining information
through false pretenses." Id.
84. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
85. King & Muto, supra note 2, at 928. King and Muto also note that Dietemann provides little
guidance to "an editor or attorney who must decide whether or not to authorize a reporter's act." Id.
at 929.
86. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 246.
87. Id. at 245.
88. Id. at 246.
89. See Crackdown on Quackery, LIFE, Nov. 1, 1963, at 72B. The article identifies Joseph Bride
as "making notes" and Bill Ray as "taking photos" while investigating. Id.
90. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 248 ("[WMe have little difficulty in concluding that clandestine
photography of the plaintiff in his den and the recordation and transmission of his conversation without
his consent resulting in his emotional distress warrants recovery for invasion of privacy in California."
(footnote omitted)).
91. Id. at 247.
92. Id. at 249.
93. Id.
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is her bias against a new technology and an unorthodox means of
newsgathering.'" The judge even posited that:
One who invites another to his home or office takes a risk that
the visitor may not be what he seems, and that the visitor may
repeat all he hears and observes when he leaves. But he does
not and should not be required to take the risk that what is heard
and seen will be transmitted by photograph or recording ... to
the public at large .....
Yet the mere fact that the Life reporters recorded their conversations,
standing alone, should not have been enough to create liability for
intrusion. The consensus at common law is that, absent statutory
prohibition,' recording a private conversation by a party to that conver-
sation is not barred.' Therefore, if the basis of Dietemann's holding is
the fact that the reporters used concealed electronic devices, it is of ques-
tionable value as precedent.
In contrast to the appellate court, the Dietemann trial court was
much more concerned with the trick used by the Life reporters to gain
entrance to the plaintiff's home than with their use of the hidden recording
devices.9" The trial court judge roundly condemned the subterfuge: "If
a person's home, or even his business premises, is to be subjected to
invasion by subterfuge for the purpose of obtaining facts concerning his
private life, then privacy would not exist."' This condemnation seems
somewhat at odds with the Ninth Circuit's caveat that one takes the risk
that his "visitor may not be what he seems." 1" Because these contradic-
tions are never resolved and because the circuit court never sets out a
cogent basis for its holding, it is of little guidance to reporters or to future
94. Cf. MEYER, supra note 3, at 81 (suggesting that a possible reason for the reluctance of
journalists to tape-record their interviews is "an emotional response to a new technology").
95. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
96. An increasing number of states have passed statutes prohibiting recording of a conversation
unless both parties consent. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 1991). For an excellent
discussion of these statutes and their potentially harmful effect on the investigative reporter, see Kent
R. Middleton, Journalists and Tape Recorders: Does Participant Monitoring Invade Privacy?, 2
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 287, 304-09,321-31 (1979) (arguing that surrepititious tape recordings
made by a party to a conversation should be allowed when public roles are being played, whether the
roles are governmental or not, because the right to privacy exists only in private roles).
97. See Becker v. Computer Sciences Corp., 541 F. Supp. 694, 702-06 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding
that Texas does not recognize a cause of action where one party to a telephone conversation
surreptitiously records the conversation without the other party's consent); see also United States v.
Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 327 n.5 (8th Cir.) (rejecting the defendant's argument that the recording
constituted a tortious invasion of privacy regardless of the purposefor recording the conversation), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
98. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 929-30 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (describing the
subterfuge but not the use of hidden recording devices), aff'd, 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
99. Dietemann, 284 F. Supp. at 929-30.
100. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
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courts in assessing potential liability for subterfuge. As a result, its
ambiguous message may exert a chilling influence on newsgatherers wary
of tort liability.10 1
Dicta in several subsequent cases do little to clarify Dietemann and,
in fact, suggest that courts harbor hostility toward media defendants who
use subterfuge to gather information, at least in cases where the person
who is a victim of the subterfuge is also the subject of the interview. Two
cases have implied that an interviewee might have a cause of action for
invasion of privacy against a reporter employing subterfuge."°
However, both cases ultimately held that gathering information about a
plaintiff from third parties, "even if pursued using subterfuge and fraud,
cannot constitute . . an intrusion upon plaintiff's solitude or seclu-
sion.-'1°
In another case, In re King World Productions, Inc.," the Sixth
Circuit expressed its hostility to the use of subterfuge even though
ultimately holding that a prior restraint on information thus gathered
violated the First Amendment. 5 In that case, a producer of the
television program Inside Edition posed as a patient and videotaped the
purported "medical malpractice and unethical behavior"' 6 of a doc-
tor. 7 The Sixth Circuit held that the trial court's granting of a tem-
porary restraining order to prevent broadcast of the surreptitiously acquired
videotape was invalid on First Amendment grounds: "No matter how
inappropriate the acquisition, or its correctness, the right to disseminate
that information is what the Constitution intended to protect." 8
However, said the court, this holding was "not intended to constitute an
approval of the surreptitious means used to gather [the] information about
101. See Allen v. Combined Communications, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2417, 2420 (Dist. Ct.,
Denver County, Colo., 1981) ("[A] chilling effect on speech could occur whenever there is a
substantial risk of liability for activities necessary to acquisition of the story.").
102. See Rifkin v. Esquire Publishing, Inc., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1384, 1386 (C.D. Cal.
1982); Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213, 1218 (D.C. 1989).
103. Rijkin, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1386 (emphasis in original); see also Wolf, 553 A.2d at
1218 (citing Rikin). In addition to these cases, one state trial court has explicitly distinguished
Dietemann on theground that the defendantwho taped a conversationwith her attorney had not gained
access to his office by subterfuge. McCall v. Courier Journal, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2337,2339-40
(Ky. Cir. Ct. 1979), aft'd, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 112 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982). The intermediate appellate
court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment of plaintiff's intrusion claim; the Kentucky
Supreme Court instead considered plaintiff's false light claim in reversing the lower courts.
104. 898 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1990).
105. Id. at 59-60.
106. Id. at 58.
107. Id. at 57-58.
108. Id. at 59 (emphasis added). The court's holding is consistent with the bias of First
Amendment jurisprudence against prior restraint and its differential treatment of the dissemination of
news as opposed to newsgathering.
1992]
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Dr. Berger, and in no way affects [the plaintiff's] ability to seek redress
under New York state tort law."'" Though not binding, this dictum
suggests that courts will not protect undercover newsgathering even where
reporters use this technique to procure socially beneficial information.
Because these cases never deal directly with the subterfuge issue, they
provide little guidance to the newsperson seeking to conform his conduct
to the law.
Cassidy v. ABC"' is less hostile to the use of subterfuge. The
defendant in Cassidy surreptitiously filmed a policeman conducting an
undercover sting at a massage parlor."' Unlike the King World court,
which ignored the plaintiff's status and the information obtained, the court
in Cassidy took into account the fact that the plaintiff was a public official
performing a public duty.' Because of his status, therefore, the court
held that "no right of privacy against intrusion can be said to exist with
reference to the gathering and dissemination of news concerning discharge
of public duties."'3 Cassidy suggests a possible framework for analysis
in the subterfuge cases, since it hinges on a functional definition of public
and private spheres."' One author has even argued that Cassidy has
"chipped away at some of the fears the press had after the Dietemann
case."" When read in conjunction with the other cases dealing with
subterfuge, however, even Cassidy cannot resolve the uncertainty regarding
the legitimacy of subterfuge as a newsgathering technique. What is
troubling about this area of the law is not the certain threat of liability, but
the danger of the unknown and the fact that "[n]o broad, general
proposition can be stated"" 6 with regard to media intrusions. As the law
now stands, the only certain way to avoid liability is to eschew surrep-
titious reporting methods altogether."7 Perhaps, then, it is fair to say of
the tort law addressing media use of subterfuge what Professors Pember
and Teeter have said of privacy law generally: "This area of the law
continues, to borrow James Thurber's phrase, to be as 'disorderly as a
whore's top drawer.'""'
109. Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
110. 377 N.E.2d 126 (111. App. Ct. 1978).
111. Id. at 128.
112. Id. at 131-32.
113. Id. at 132.
114. Id. at 131.
115. DON R. PEmBER, MAss MEDiA LAw 235 (4th ed. 1987).
116. Id. at231.
117. See Pember & Teeter, supra note 19, at 91 ("If reporters maintain traditional means of
investigative reporting and eschew hidden cameras, microphones, bugs and similar surreptitious
deviaes, the mass media can avoid exposure to actions claiming unlawfiul intrusion.").
118. Id. at 57 (paraphrasing George Plimpton, Max Steele & James Thurber, James Thurber, in
WRrrpS AT WORK: THE PARIs INTrEvinwS 83, 86 (Malcom Cowley ed., 1959)). The authors
elaborate: "To say that the law of privacy is not a great hallmark of logic and clarity in American law
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II. The Consequences of Doctrinal Uncertainty
This disorderliness in the tort doctrine has serious consequences.
Because the line between protected newsgathering and tortious newsgather-
ing is difficult to draw, a reporter is likely to eschew certain nonroutine
newsgathering methods such as subterfuge and to engage in rational self-
censorship even in cases where his conduct would ultimately be lawful and
would produce valuable information. Although the precise extent of such
a chilling effect is difficult to determine, individuals faced with potentially
large damage awards "steer far wider of the unlawful zone. "119
Moreover, media lawyers, who are generally hired by owners of
newspapers, television stations, or radio stations, are apt to be conservative
in the advice they give." As one author has noted, editors tend to be
"fearful ... of the contemporary world of invasion of privacy,"121 even
though privacy suits are far less common than those for libel." Thus,
unless it appears that the investigation will uncover a very important piece
of news or unless the media defendant can easily bear the cost of potential
liability (as in the case of a highly popular and lucrative production such
as 60 Minutes), media lawyers are likely to advise clients to stay well away
from the potential danger zone. Hence, the uncertainty in the tort doctrine
of intrusion may deter use of novel newsgathering methods.
Self-censorship by investigative reporters and their editors is
rational: the liability of a reporter and his newspaper for employing
subterfuge may be substantial. The probem is compounded by the fact that
courts have never settled on the proper measure of damages in intrusion
cases. " In Dietemann, the court held that a plaintiff could recover
damages for both the underlying intrusion upon his seclusion, as well as for
the publication of information tortiously acquired." On the other hand,
in Costlow v. Cusimano,1" the court limited the plaintiff's damages to
those stemming from the intrusion only."2
The Dietemann damages rule obviously encourages extreme caution.
Consider again the dilemma of the 20/20 reporters considering whether to
is to indulge in egregious understatement." Id.
119. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
120. Cf. LucAs A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 118-19 (1991)
(repeating an argument made by the press that the risk of high pretrial discovery costs may have a
chilling effect on what it publishes).
121. SANFOORD, supra note 39, § 11.1, at 427.
122. Id.
123. See King & Muto, supra note 2, at 937.
124. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971) (affirming the trial court's
$1000 damage award based on the harm caused by the intrusion that was "enhanced" by the subsequent
publication of the tortiously acquired information).
125. 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 1970).
126. Id. at 97.
19921 447
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use subterfuge to uncover the abuses at the Texas nursing homes. If the
reporters do employ subterfuge and a court applying the Dietemann
damages rule declares their conduct tortious, the reporters and the network
may be liable for any damages, including those caused by publication, that
proximately result from the intrusion. Presumably, therefore, the owners
of private nursing homes might recover for any loss of business caused by
the expos6 as well as for any mental distress caused by the intrusion and
the subsequent publication.
Professors King and Muto present a scenario that is even more
frightening to the investigative reporter:
Assume that [Woodward and Bernstein] had committed a
trespass [or an intrusion] for which President Nixon could
maintain an action.... [Damages based on publication] could
be substantial if they included the mental distress caused by
having to resign the Presidency in disgrace."z
But it is not just the fear of large damage awards that may cause a reporter
to err on the side of "safe" or conventional reporting techniques-tech-
niques that may not bring forth the desired information. Even if the
reporter expects to be the ultimate victor in an intrusion suit, the fear of
incurring substantial litigation costs may exert a chilling effect on his
newsgathering.1 Current tort doctrine, therefore, may have the per-
verse effect of punishing the reporter whose stories promote public welfare.
It is precisely in those situations where the results of publication or
broadcast may be the most dramatic that the press will face the largest
specter of liability. 29
Equally as important, the lack of a bright line between legitimate
and illegitmate newsgathering techniques means that individual privacy is
not adequately safeguarded. Because both the Restatement definition of
intrusion and the tort doctrine are amorphous, some reporters may decide
to proceed with investigations that invade privacy to the point of being
tortious. The best means for protecting individual privacy is to provide a
clear liability rule to prevent the intrusion from occurring in the first place.
Obviously, this analysis of the detrimental effects of uncertainty in
the tort law shapes the path of possible reform of this particularly
unpredictable area of the law. In order to foster investigative reporting
while protecting individual privacy, a brighter line must be drawn-one
that distinguishes protected from unprotected newsgathering methods. An
ad hoc balancing of the two interests is inadequate, since it involves the
127. King & Muto, supra note 2, at 942.
128. As one commentator has noted, "the more complicated the law, the more expensive the legal
fees." RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 250 (1986).
129. Of course, not all stories that produce dramatic results involve the use of subterfuge.
[Vol. 71:433
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application of vague, subjective criteriat" and, consequently, suffers
from the same uncertainty that plagues the current intrusion doctrine. This
Note therefore advocates the extension of a qualified common-law privilege
to allow newsgatherers to employ subterfuge in certain narrowly confined
contexts.
III. The Newsgathering Privilege
The qualified common-law privilege3 espoused by this Note
would protect the newsgatherer who employs subterfuge to investigate the
work-related activities of those engaged in public business. Under this
privilege, a newsgatherer who employs subterfuge will prevail in an
intrusion action based on the subterfuge if she can show that she had
probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was engaged in illegal,
fraudulent, or potentially harmful conduct. Though offering newsgatherers
considerable protection, this privilege has several limiting features. First,
the probable cause standard requires a newsgatherer to establish that she
had a reasonable belief that the plaintiff was engaged in illegal, fraudulent,
or potentially harmful activities before she conducted her undercover
investigations. Thus, the privilege does not allow subterfuge to be used by
the press to conduct "fishing expeditions." Second, the privilege is limited
in scope. While it recognizes the valuable role of the journalist acting as
participant-observer, the privilege does not permit the press to employ
subterfuge to pry into private lives; nor does it allow the press to use
subterfuge to gain access to private homes. Third, the privilege is limited
by the abuse-of-privilege doctrine, which prevents the reporter from
employing the privilege for a purpose other than that for which it was
intended. Therefore, unlike current tort doctrine, the newsgathering
privilege clearly delineates a sphere of protected newsgathering activity,
thereby striking a balance between the competing interests of the press, the
individual, and society.
Thus, this Note argues that a qualified common-law tort privilege
should be created to remove the shadow of tort liability that looms over the
reporter who uncovers through the use of subterfuge abuses committed by
those who serve the public. As conceived, this privilege would apply to
130. See Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (explicitly declining
to invoke a privilege based on the balance between the scope of a newsgatherer's intrusion and the
newsworthiness of the story obtained through that intrusion).
131. See FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 45, at 254 (discussing the "conditional" or
'qualified" privilege at common law, under which a defendant will prevail in a defamation action
unless the plaintiff can show that the speaker "abused" his privilege).
1992]
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newsgathering activities 132 aimed at anyone conducting public business.
Kent Middleton has defined public business as follows:
Public business includes the work-related activities, whether
legal or illegal, of public officials, public figures, businessmen
and professionals. Anyone who offers a product or service to
another or exercises a public responsibility carries out public
business. 133
This definition rejects the traditional public/private sector distinction. For
purposes of this privilege, the concept of "serving the public" includes not
only private sector business; it also includes the services provided by
charitable institutions. Thus defined, "public business" allows the press to
"monitor not only the activities of government, but also the activities of
non-government institutions which increasingly affect the public wel-
fare."" However, this definition is limited in scope. It permits the use
of subterfuge to gather information only about the work-related activities
of those engaged in public business. Consequently, it seeks to protect not
only private locations, most notably the home, but also the private roles
and private lives of those engaged in public business.
The argument for the creation of this privilege is not so radical as
one might suppose; rather, the privilege would merely provide an advance
statement of judicial policy with regard to certain limited contexts of media
newsgathering activity. This definition is analogous to, although broader
than, the one employed by the Cassidy court. 135 That court refused to
find that the media's use of subterfuge had invaded the plaintiff's right of
privacy where the plaintiff, a police officer, "was not a private citizen
engaged in conduct which pertained only to himself"136 and was instead
a "public official performing a laudable public service and discharging a
public duty."137 The Cassidy court's approach to the intrusion claim
embodies a frank recognition that the press plays a vital role in promoting
public monitoring of public servants and that the press should be protected
when performing that role. Yet the court's reasoning considered the
identity of the plaintiff as only a factor relevant to whether a tort had
occurred; the newsgathering privilege espoused by this Note would instead
132. Although this privilege is primarily aimed at protection of the so-called institutional press,
a functional definition of newsgatherers might be adopted that extends the privilege to those who
perform the monitoring function envisioned for the press in the creation of this privilege. For a good
discussion of this issue, see David F. Freedman, Note, Press Passes and Trespasses: Newsgathering
on Private Property, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1298, 1321-25 (1984).
133. Middleton, supra note 96, at 321.
134. Id. at 323.
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draw a predictable, bright-line rule to protect newsgatherers who use
subterfuge to monitor those engaged in public business.
This broader privilege is justified by a pragmatic recognition of the
role of the modem press. The press is the chief information broker in
modem society;"' it acts as (1) a "neutral finder[] and conveyor[] of
information,"139 (2) a watchdog of government,"' and (3) an advocate
of social reform.1 ' By protecting this third role, the newsgathering
privilege acknowledges the detriment to the public welfare engendered by
crime, corruption, and fraud in the so-called private sector as well as in the
public sector. Moreover, permitting monitoring in the private sector ack-
nowledges the increasing interaction between government and private
industry and the "rapid fusion of economic and political power, a merging
of science, industry, and government, and a high degree of interaction
between the intellectual, governmental, and business worlds."' 42 More
precisely, "[miuch activity . . . which was once exclusively part of the
private sector, is now so intertwined with government and the public
welfare that it must be subject to public scrutiny fully as much as
government activity." 43
Yet this privilege is not without limits. As expressed previously,
the privilege seeks to protect individual privacy as well as freedom of the
press. Reporters may abuse their power of information-gathering to delve
into private lives. One critic has expressed his criticism of the press
metaphorically as follows: "Investigative reporters ... are the guard dogs
of society, but the trouble with guard dogs is that they sometimes attack
with equal fervor the midnight burglar and the midday mailman."' The
privilege advocated by this Note does not loose the guard dog on unsuspec-
ting private citizens. The reporter's ability to employ subterfuge is
circumscribed in at least three ways.
First, the newsgathering privilege should not attach to the reporter's
conduct absent a showing of probable cause. As applied, the probable
cause standard would be analogous to that employed in malicious
prosecution cases. Hence, "[p]robable cause is a reasonable ground for
belief in the guilt of the party" 45 the reporter investigates. In other
138. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983) (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).
139. Paul H. Weaver, The New Journalism and the Old-Thoughts After Watergate, PUB.
INTEREST, Spring 1974, at 67, 74.
140. See Nick D. Williams, America's Third Force: The Watchdog Press, in THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE PRESS 169, 170-71 (Gerald Gross ed., 1966).
141. Weaver, supra note 139, at 74.
142. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
143. Middleton, supra note 96, at 323.
144. MIcHAEL J. ARLEN, THE CAMERA AGE: ESSAYS ON TELEviSION 172-73 (1981).
145. W. PAGE KEETON E AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 119, at 876 (5th ed. 1984).
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words, probable cause is an objective standard:"4 the newsgatherer must
establish that his belief that the plaintiff was engaged in illegal, fraudulent,
or potentially harmful activities was reasonable. 4 7 The "traditional test
of probable cause ... focuses on the evidence known to the accuser [or,
in this case, the reporter] and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from
it. " 14  In order to establish probable cause, thereby obtaining the
protection of the privilege, a reporter must present the information upon
which he relied in determining whether to conduct an undercover
investigation. Mere speculation on the part of the reporter will be
insufficient to establish probable cause. 9 However, if he can show that
he based his decision to investigate on reliable information that reasonably
led him to suspect wrongdoing,"s then the court should apply the
newsgathering privilege to protect his use of subterfuge." The probable
cause standard thus prevents the reporter from employing subterfuge in an
irresponsible manner.
The reporter is similarly restricted by the limited scope of the
privilege. The privilege does not extend to the use of subterfuge to gain
access to private homes or to investigate private matters about an
individual, such as his or her AIDS status. If privacy is to have any
meaning, it must protect the individual in his private dealings and in his
home. '5 In our private roles, we let our guard down. Relationships in
the private, as opposed to the public, sphere are characterized by intimacy
and trust. Therefore, intrusive prying into the home should not be
permitted, even where, as in Dietemann, one might argue that the plaintiff
was really using his home as a business. Drawing a bright line to protect
the home acts as a prophylactic rule, and, while the line may shield some
abuses from press scrutiny, the strong interest in protecting the individual
in his innermost sanctum, his "castle," justifies barring the use of
subterfuge in the home.53
146. See, e.g., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (S.D. Ohio 1973);
Masterson v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 326 P.2d 918, 926 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 662 cmt. e (1977).
148. KEETON ET AL., supra note 145, § 119, at 877.
149. See id. § 119, at 876 (noting that "fu]nfounded suspicion and conjecture" will not support
a finding of probable cause).
150. Id. § 119, at 876-77.
151. Courts routinely determine the existence of probable cause in malicious prosecution cases.
Id. § 119, at 882.
152. The core of privacy is society's recognition that the individual possesses a "privileged
territory or domain" within which he is free to include or exclude others. 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS 24 (1985) (citation omitted).
153. George Orwell dramatically describes the consequences of invasions into the innermost
sanctum of individual privacy: "There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being
watched at any given moment.... You had to live-did live, from habit that became instinct-in the
assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and except in darkness, every movement
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Finally, courts may check newsgathering abuses by using the abuse-
of-privilege doctrine to curb inappropriate newsgathering even in the
"privileged" sphere of public businesses. A defendant abuses a privilege
when he uses it for a purpose other than that for which it was intend-
ed." Thus, for example, abuse of privilege might be found where the
defendant newsgatherer employed subterfuge solely to harass or annoy the
plaintiff or to gain access to his secret business records. Of course, the
failure of the privilege to attach to the defendant's newsgathering activities
or his loss of the privilege does not necessarily mean that he will lose if
sued for intrusion. It merely makes it more likely that the defendant will
have to litigate his claim. What the privilege does, then, is to send a
message to newsgatherers like those in Dietemann who intrude into private
homes that they employ subterfuge at their own peril.
As Professor Post has noted, intrusion protects those rules of
conduct, or "rules of civility," l"5 by which we constitute ourselves as a
society.156 Allowing the use of subterfuge in public business would not
represent a shocking departure from current social practices, nor would it
contravene ordinary expectations of privacy; rather, it would merely make
the legal doctrine of privacy consistent with social norms.157 The
intrusion tort protects the individual from unreasonable intrusions upon his
seclusion in contexts where he has a justifiable expectation of privacy. 5
Those engaged in public business, however, do not have such an expec-
tation in regard to their work-related activity. Public businesses are
characterized by a certain degree of institutional formality and social
distance. 59 People deal with one another at arm's length.
Moreover, many such businesses may already be accustomed to
monitoring by persons posing as patrons. 16r In the restaurant business,
surreptitious monitoring by health inspectors and critics is common.
Monitoring occurs frequently in banking and car repair as well. 1  In the
scrutinized." GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 6-7 (Signet Classic 1984) (1949).
154. See FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 45, at 254 (noting that a plaintiff may prove abuse
by showing that the defendant did not honestly believe what he said, or that the defendant published
his statement more widely than was justified by the occasion that provided the privilege).
155. Post, supra note 76, at 975-76 (arguing that dissonance between social norms and the
intrusion doctrine is manifestly undesirable).
156. Id.
157. See John Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 33, 37
(Dec. 1965 special issue) ("It is the fertile dilemma of law that it must always be out of step with
society, but that people must always (because they work better with fewer contradictions, if for no other
reason) attempt to reduce the lack of phase.").
158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B & cmt. b (1977).
159. Middleton, supra note 96, at 323.
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medical profession, studies by social scientists posing as patients are almost
routine. 62 Even in those professions where monitoring is not so per-
vasive, the person takes the chance that those he serves will repeat
everything that he says to the news media. Hence, the creation of a
privilege to allow newspersons to observe those who serve the public in the
performance of their professional roles should not be deemed an invasion
of the privacy rights of those observed, even if the reporter has posed as
an "ordinary," nonmedia patron.
The courts have explicitly recognized this precept in the employer-
employee context. 63 The courts have consistently held that a plaintiff's
job-related conversations or communications are not private. An employee
does not commit an intrusion if he records a meeting with his employer
concerning his continued employment"' or even if he records a dispute
between himself and his employer." Moreover, an employee has no
cause of action for intrusion where his employer, as part of a company
policy, monitors his personal calls." In light of the courts' recognition
of the impersonal nature of workplace interactions in this line of intrusion
cases, the extension of this reasoning to the creation of the limited
newsgathering privilege advocated here does not seem farfetched,
especially in light of the important benefits that may flow from the press
acting as participant-observer.
A final caveat is warranted. This privilege does not obviate the
need for journalistic ethics. Cases will arise in which the newsperson must
exercise judgment and restraint. 67 Journalists must bear the "important
responsibility of keeping themselves honest, and fair."" Deception
should not become an unanalyzed habit." As Sissela Bok has convin-
cingly argued, the reporter considering whether to use any type of
deception should balance his "reasons for and against doing so";"7 he
162. Id. at 197.
163. See, e.g., Barr v. Arco Chem. Corp., 529 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding
that an employee's surreptitious recording of a conversation with his employer did not constitute
actionable intrusion under either Pennsylvania or Texas law).
164. Id. at 1282-83.
165. Kemp v. Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (D. Nev. 1985).
166. Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
167. See BOK, supra note 160, at 121. Recognizing that the use of subterfuge to gather news may
involve difficult decisions, the British Press Council, a voluntary regulatory organization, recommends
that subterfuge only be employed in cases where there is an overriding public interest. John Authers,
Sources Must Be Protected, Says Press Council, FIN. TIMES LTD., Mar. 16, 1990, at 10.
168. J. William Fulbright, Fulbright on the Press, COLUM. JOURNAusM REv., Nov.-Dec. 1975,
at 39, 43.
169. See MEYER, supra note 3, at 83 ("It is the presence or absence of reflection that is crucial
[when determining the morality of a journalist's use of deception], not whether or not intrusive
deceptions are ever made.").
170. BOK, supra note 160, at 121.
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should try to "search for honest alternatives, or to distinguish among
different forms and degrees of deception, or to consider whether some
circumstances warrant[] it more than others."1 While the newsgather-
ing privilege advocated by this Note does not solve every ethical dilemma
facing the investigative reporter, it does aid the reporter in facing his legal
dilemma.
IV. Conclusion
Although sometimes reviled as muckrakers, investigative reporters
play a valuable role in exposing societal ills and advancing reform. The
success of investigative journalism is due, at least in part, to its use of
novel newsgathering techniques. Yet some of these same techniques pose
a threat to individual privacy. Current tort doctrine strikes an unsatisfac-
tory balance between these competing interests. The qualified common-law
privilege advocated by this Note, in contrast, would protect those
newsgathering activities that promote the public welfare. Equally
significantly, by sending a clear message to editors, media lawyers, and
reporters about the scope of protected newsgathering activity, it would
deter newsgathering aimed at individuals in their homes and in their private
lives generally. The requirement that a newsgatherer demonstrate probable
cause and the abuse-of-privilege doctrine provide additional safeguards
against press abuses. Finally, while this Note has specifically addressed
creation of the privilege to protect press use of subterfuge, the same
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